Chapter 83 – John

In Gallipoli 1915 Through Turkish Eyes , Haluk Oral describes how a Turkish 1:25,000 scale topographic map was taken from dying a Turkish officer after 19 May attack, sent to Survey of Egypt and reproduced as 1:20,000 by a team of mapmakers, including T.E. Lawrence (aka Lawrence of Arabia). Contours were shown in metres. The 1:20,000 map “Kurija Dere” is Australian War Memorial collection reference C1153025, or map reference G7432G1S65VI_11a.

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1153025

John Monash’s letters to his wife Victoria are preserved in War Letters of General Monash . Some details include:

30 August – Health of troops is problem.

5 September – Hamilton’ s plan has failed due to the old story, being insufficient troops, inadequate munitions, attempting more than was possible with the means available. Left Reesrve Gully on 6 August with 3350 men, now have 1037. Australian and New Zealander troops are the best available. None other could have held on at Gallipoli.

Roland Perry describes the August offensive in his biography Monash: The Outsider Who Won a War .  Some details referenced include:

p. 223 – Godley and Birdwood came forward, days after the 8 August attack and toured 4th lines with Monash, encouraging him for his “excellent trenchwork”. Cox plucked 500 of 13th and 14th Battalions for an attack on Hill 60, with the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, an Indian Brigade and 330 men from New Army. The attack was planned by Birdwood, Godley and Cox for 3:30pm on 21 August, after artillery barrage. The artillery was not in place at appointed time. Monash was horrified that orders were changed at the last minute, stating  “It was altogether a mis-timed, mis-calculated, and mis-directed operation.” Feeble artillery warned Turks on Hill 60 to aim their machine guns, rifles and artillery. The 1st Wave of 150men of 13th charged and was shredded. Only 40 not killed or wounded. The 2nd wave of 150 men of 14th charged and only 50 survived. After battle Monash could see the carnage and knew could not save wounded without reinforcements. He bypassed Cox, sent runner to Godley at Anzac.

p. 224 – Embittered Monash asked for help for “survivors” on the battlefield. Wounded in front of Hill 60 lay frying in burning scrub, some died from exploding ammunition pouches. Godley was offended by word “survivors”, wished Monash would talk of exact number of casualties. Would appreciate it if Monash would  refrain from exaggeration, it could lower morale.

Peter Pederson, in Monash as a Military Commander , describes John Monash and the 4th Brigade’s involvement in the August offensive. Some referenced details include:

p. 114 – By 18 August, Men of Monash’s 4th Brigade were sick with bronchitis from sleeping without blankets, personal kits and bedding brought from Reserve Gully at this time.

p. 115 – On 19 August, a conference took place with Cox and General Russell (Commander of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles), regarding the planned attack on Hill 60. Monash had the most difficult task on the right flank which was exposed to enfilade fire from Turks on Hill 100. Godley’s plan was to provide artillery from 2:15 to 3:00pm.  On 20 August, Monash issued detailed orders – 250 men from each of 13th and 14th to advance from 13th line. Men on right to provide covering fire at Turks.The Turkish front was divided up amongst battalion commanders, according to fields of fire, to ensure no portion of Turkish trenches was missed. Quick re-organisation then required, 15th to follow and construct trenches to join new territory so attackers not left isolated. Covering force of 50 men to first clear valley of snipers.

p. 116 – RMO [Regimental Medical Officer] of 13th Battalion had difficulty finding 250 fit men to participate. At 1:15pm Monash was informed that Godley had offered artillery support also to English 9th Corps, so now artillery support for Monash’s 4th Brigade would be delayed to start at 3:00pm, and the attack would be delayed until 3:25pm. Monash watched the attack with Bean from 13th Battalion trenches. 1st and 2nd waves were cut down, some [about 1/3] reached shelter on far side of valley. 3rd wave, burdened with picks and shovels, could not advance beyond the creek bed. Shell exploded and started fire. Men incinerated and shot trying to escape. At 5:00 pm, Monash told Russell his men could advance no further and would dig in. When darkness fell, 15th began to trench across valley. Artillery raised too quickly when could have provided a slowly advancing curtain of protections. Instead Turks waited in trenches until it stopped, then stood in their trenches and fired on attackers when they were still climbing over their own parapets.

p. 117 – Covering fire from 4th Brigade could not compensate for the absence of artillery or other support. Monash comment on late change of orders… commanders did not know what was going to happen, everybody got rattled, waited… result was considerable loss of life and little gain. Monash hated unnecessary changes to orders once they were issued and adopted Napoleon’s aphorism: “Order, Counter Order, Disorder”. Monash requested relief for survivors. Godley was furious at the word “survivors”, as it might provoke alarm and despondency. The Official Medical History describes condition of the 4th Brigade at this time as “deplorable”.

Charles Bean includes a detailed description of the attacks on Hill 60 on 21 August 1915 and following, in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 , vol II, chapter XXVI: Hill 60 (pp. 718-762). Some referenced details include:

p. 723 – A map of the planned attack is shown, including British advance on W Hills and Scimitar Hill.

p. 724 – Hill 60 was the low knoll forming the seaward end of the spur known as “Flat Hill” to the Turks, on which the Australian 4th Brigade had met with disaster on 8 August 1915. Hill 60 was little more than a swelling in the plain, but prevented Anzacs from commanding the Anafarta gap beyond. Also, two useful wells lay near its foot.

p. 725 – Genreal Cox’s plan was to incorporate the knoll of Hill 60 and the two wells into the Anzac line.

p. 726 – On 20 August, Godley and Cox arranged artillery protection for attack. Hill 60 spur covered with dense prickly scrub, a few mere bushes and a single stunted oak tree. The spur forked from main Damakjelik spur at Hill 100 and ran parallel for nearly one mile.

p. 727 – Turks had crowned Hill 60 with a redoubt, made of several concentric rings of trenches.

p. 728 – Initial artillery arrangement was 2:15-3:00pm, by Godley. Change of plan issued at 1:30pm to delay Anzac attack from 3:00 to 3:30pm. At 2:00pm the first guns opened. Half an hour later, the main bombardment on Suvla front commenced. John and men watched, knowing the sequence. A haze of dust and shell smoke soon covered the plain, but at 3:15pm line of advancing British marked by puffs of Turkish shrapnel in the air above it.

p. 729 – At 3:20pm, the Hill 60 attackers, made up of Connaught Rangers (700), New Zealand Mounted Rifles (400) and Australians (500) climbed out into minor gullies ready to attack, were seen by Turks and fired upon. At 3:30pm Australians and New Zealanders were ordered to go.

p. 730 – A result of late alteration was that Hill 60 and its neighbourhood received “practically no bombardment, but the enemy was thoroughly awakened. Severe opposition was therefore certain.” Australians, were warned by commanders that only chance was to sprint whole way, charged 200 yards across valley in one unbroken rush at 3:30 pm. The New Zealanders charged at 3:45pm.

p. 731 – notes refer to photo G01219 (plate 119, Vol 12) which shows single oak tree, photo taken from location on 21 August, near where Australians charged from. Australians clustered near single bushy oak, given to them as a guiding marker. Map shows attack route and oak tree. At 4:00pm, New Zealanders reached their objective, Indians on left and Australians on right had not. Russell ordered Australian advance.

p. 732 – The Australian task much more difficult than the others, Turks to Hill 100 commanded the valley.

p. 734 – after Australian charge, the slope of the valley was sprinkled with the tumbled forms of men. Only 40 of the first line of 150 reached the slope below the oak tree and could not advance further across exposed flat. At 3:45pm the second line of Australians charged. Another 40 made it across the gully. At 4:00pm, General Russell sent Monash order to advance. Third line attempted to advance, could not get across as weighed down by picks and shovels. At 4:15pm, the 10th Hampshire started to cross, but were hit by a shell that blew men bodily into the air. Withering fire came from up valley. One man reached far side. Australians at oak tree cut off from reinforcements.

p. 735 – A fire started from the Turkish shells. Flames burned dead and wounded. Clothing burned, exploded bombs and rifle ammunition. Wounded attempting to crawl from flames were shot by Turks. At 5:00pm Russell received report from Australians: “Impossible to push on. Fire across wheatfield by Big Tree too hot. Am digging in.”

p. 736-762 – attacks on Hill 60 continued until 29 August, costing hundreds of lives, but resulted in claiming only a partial hold on one side of the hill.